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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
BRIAN BROADWATER,
Defendant / Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Court of Appeals Case No. 20010702-CA
APPELLEE'S BRIEF
Nature of Proceeding: Appeal
Appeal from the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Judge Randall N. Skanchy
Priority No. 2

)

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW &
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue(s) for Review. (1) Is the trial court's determination that the officer-

citizen encounter was a level one consensual encounter correct as a matter of law?
(2) If the defendant was seized or stopped under a "Level II" analysis, was there
reasonable articulable suspicion justifying that stop or seizure?
Standard of Review.

Factual findings underlying trial courts' decisions

regarding motions to suppress are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard".
State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). A reviewing court "will find clear
error only if [it decides] that the factual findings made by the trial court are not
1

adequately supported by the record." Id. Facts are considered "in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination." L± An appellate court then "reviews
the trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard,
[citation omitted], according no deference to its legal conclusions." Id. See also
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274, 276 (Utah App.2000).
Preservation of the Argument. The Defendant filed his initial Motion and
Memorandum on July 6, 2000. R.13-16. The evidentiary hearing was held 11-27200 before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. R.20. The City filed its memo in
response on 1-11-2001. R.22-48.

The trial court (The Honorable Randall N.

Skanchy) issued its ruling on February 8, 2001. R.51. The defendant apparently
moved the trial court to reconsider its ruling on 3-26-2001. R.53. The trial court
denied that motion for reconsideration on March 28, 2001. R55.
III.

RELEVANT STATUTES
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution (set forth in Defendant^

Brief at page 2)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (set forth in Defendant's Brief at page 2)
Salt Lake City Code Section 12.24.100 (included as Addendum A to this
brief)
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.36.130 (included as Addendum B to this

brief)
IV.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The City submits the following statement of facts, which is the statement of

facts submitted by Richard Daynes on behalf of the City in its Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (found in the Record at pages 22-25,
hereinafter R.22-25). Citation to the record transcript is denoted as R. 122/*, where
122 indicates the record page assigned to the first page of the transcript and *
indicates the interior pagination of the transcript as submitted to the court.
1. This matter came before the Court on November 27, 2000 for a motion
hearing. R.22.
2. Plaintiff was represented by Richard W. Daynes, Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor. R.22.
3. Defendant was represented by Ben Hamilton, Attorney for defendant.
R.22.
4.Defendant contend[ed] this became a level two stop and that there was not
reasonable suspicion for the stop. Video Transcript ("VT") 4:32:20. R. 112/3.
5. Two witnesses were called, Officer Gardiner and Officer Hunt of the Salt
Lake City Police Department. R.23.
6. Officer Gardiner testified:
3

a. He ha[d] been a police officer for over 21 years. VT 4:31:55.
R. 112/2.
b. On March 12. 2000, at 2:10a.m. he received a call to the parking lot
at 1440 West 200 South on a suspicious vehicle. VT 4:33:19-50 &
4:39:19. R.l 12/3.
c. Officer Gardiner d[id] not know who the complaining person was.
[VT]4:33:19[.]R.112/3-4.
d. The parking lot surrounds the tavern. VT 4:43:55. R. 112/11.
e. This location is a bar or tavern which sells alcohol. VT 4:33:28.
R. 112/3.
f. The tavern was closed when the officers arrived. VT 4:48:13[.]
R.l 12/11.
g. There were no other vehicles in the parking lot other than the
defendant's vehicle. VT 4:34:08. R.l 12/4.
h. Officer Hunt was already at the scene when he [Officer Gardiner]
arrived. VT 34:19. R.l 12/4.
i. Both officers parked their vehicles behind the defendant's vehicle
and defendant's vehicle was not blocked in, but had clear access to
leave the parking lot by pulling forward. VT 4:51:17. R. 112/17.
4

j . Officer Gardiner did not activate his overhead flashing lights but
did put a spotlight on the car toward the passenger seat.

VT

4:40:36 & 4:51:33. R.l 12/6.
k. Upon contact with the defendant's car, Officer Gardiner noticed a
man passed out or sleeping in the driver's seat of the car. VT
4:41:57. R.l 12/4.
1. The seat was tilted back at least part way VT 4:34:58. R. 112/4.
m. The defendant[4s] car was parked facing eastbound and the engine
was running. VT 4:34:40 & 4:41:40. R.l 12/4.
n. Officer Gardiner believed the defendant might be a DUI driver
because the defendant was asleep in his car in a closed Tavern
parking lot with the engine running.

VT 4:44:45 & 4:48:30.

R.l 12/15.
o. Officer Gardiner believed this might be trespassing in the parking
lot. VT 4:39:48 & 4:48:22. R. 112/8.
p. Officer Gardiner had some concern for the defendant's safety and
thought he might be DUI impaired in a vehicle.

VT 4:48:40,

4:49:07,4:49:11 & 4:49:30. R.l 12/15.
q. Officer Gardiner knocked on the door of the vehicle. VT 4:35:13
5

& 4:36:58. R.l 12/6-7.
r. When the defendant woke up either the defendant opened the
window or door, or Officer Gardiner opened the door. VT 4:36:56
& 4:55:27. R.l 12/13.
s. Upon awaking the defendant spoke with Officer Gardiner. Upon
contact with the defendant, Officer Gardiner noticed bloodshot
watery eyes, a flushed face, very slurred speech and a strong odor
of alcohol. VT 4:35:40, 4:36:36 & 4:37:30. R. 112/5.
t. Officer Gardiner made his contact based upon the totality of the
circumstances. VT 4:50:55. R.l 12/16.
7. Officer Hunt testified:
a. Officer Hunt did not activate his overhead lights. VT 4:58:56. R.l 12/22.
b. Officer Hunt used a flashlight to look into the car. VT 4:59:20. R. 112/22.
c. They [Officers Hunt and Gardiner] contacted the defendant by knocking
on the window. VT 4:59:27. R.l 12/22.
d. Officer Hunt first testified that defendant woke up and opened the
window, but then could not remember if the defendant opened the
window or if the door was opened to talk to the defendant. VT 4:59:27.
R.l 12/23.

e. He d[id] not know and [couldjnot remember who opened the door or
window and whether there was any conversation before defendant got out
of he vehicle. VT 5:00:16-5:01:04. R.l 12/25.
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's determination that there was no seizure or illegal detention is

correct pursuant to established case law regarding the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution. The encounter qualifies as a Level I consensual encounter under Utah
law. In the alternative, there was sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to
justify a Level II stop or seizure.

Finally, Community Caretaker Analysis, if

applied to these facts indicates that the contact was justifiable under that doctrine.
VI.

ARGUMENT.

A.
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT THIS WAS A
LEVEL I, CONSENSUAL POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTER.
1. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.
Factual findings underlying trial courts' decisions regarding motions to
suppress are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard". State v. Trover, 910
P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). A reviewing court "will find clear error only if [it decides]
that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the
record." Id. Facts are considered "in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." Id. The findings of the trial court will be addressed in turn. Those
7

findings are found in the appellate record at R.51, and in the Defendant's Brief as
Addendum A.
a. "Officers pulled behind vehicle of deft, had access to leave if chose to,"
Officer Gardiner indicated that both officers' vehicles were parked behind
the defendant's vehicle. Rl 12/8. The testimony of Officer Gardiner indicated that
the officers did not block in the defendant's car with theirs, and that if he had
woken up, he could have driven out of the parking lot. Record at 112/17.
b. "No overhead lights or siren."
The testimony of Officer Gardiner indicated that he did not have his flashing
red and blue lights on at the time contact occurred. R. 122/6,17. Officer Hunt
testified that he did not activate his overhead lights either. R.l 12/22.
c. "No stealth involved

"

This encounter took place in what Officer Gardiner described as a "fairly
well lighted area at that time". R. 112/6. Officer Gardiner did not have his rotating
overhead lights on, just his spotlight. R. 112/6. That spotlight "was lighting up the
interior of the [defendant's] vehicle." R.l 12/9. Officer Gardiner agreed with the
defense description of the spotlight as flooding the vehicle interior with pretty
bright light, saying "Yeah, it's quite a bit of light." R.l 12/9. Officer Gardiner was
in uniform. R.l 12/6.

The testimony of Officer Gardiner indicated that he

8

approached the defendant's vehicle on the driver's side. Officer Gardiner indicated
that he and Officer Hunt approached the vehicle at the same time for officer safety
reasons. R.l 12/9. Officer Gardiner had a chance to look inside the vehicle before
he attempted to communicate with the defendant. R.l 12/9. At the vehicle, Officer
Gardiner used his flashlight. R.l 12/13. Officer Gardiner observed the defendant
asleep in his vehicle, with the seat described as "back" or "tilted back" (reclined to
some degree). R.l 12/10. Finally, officers had to knock on the car window to get
the defendant's attention and wake him up. R.l 12/5.
Officer Hunt testified that the officers had their patrol car headlights on, they
both got out and shined their flashlight(s) inside his car. R.l 12/22. Officer Hunt
also indicated that the officers pounded on the window in an attempt to get the
defendant's attention to wake him up. R.l 12/22. Officer Hunt indicated that the
defendant then woke up. R. 112/23.
d. "No . . . other indicia such as asking to remain . . . . "
Officer Gardiner's testimony at the hearing indicated that he did not recall
what, if anything, he said as he "banged" on the window. R.l 12/14. Officer Hunt
indicated that he did not remember whether there was any conversation between
Officer Gardiner and the defendant before the defendant was asked to get out of the
car. R.l 12/24.
9

e. "No . . . other indicia such a s , . , display of weapons or otherwise."
Testimony at the hearing indicated that both officers were in uniform.
Rl 12/12-13. The transcript does not make any reference to weapons being actively
or aggressively displayed, other than what might be implied or expected to be
carried by a police officer in uniform, i.e. holstered firearm, holstered pepper spray,
and holstered expandable baton.
f. "Asked what he was doing

"

Officer Gardiner indicated that he did not recall giving any verbal commands
to the defendant as he was looking through the window. R. 112/6. Later, Officer
Gardiner agreed that he did not remember what he specifically said as he "banged"
on the window, if anything. Rl 12/14. Officer Gardiner indicated that after he had
gotten the attention of the defendant that there was some verbal exchange or
interaction. Rl 12/5. Officer Gardiner did indicate that when an actual conversation
began that the defendant was inside the vehicle. R. 112/19. This occurred when the
door was open, or when the window was down, with the defendant inside the
vehicle. R.l 12/19.
Officer Gardiner later testified that he "wanted to investigate further, who
[the defendant] was, what he was doing." R. 112/16. Officer Gardiner indicated that
among the questions he asked was "what was he doing". R.l 12/19.
10

g. "fDlid not order out of vehicle

"

Officer Hunt's recollection was that the defendant was asked to get out of his
car, at some point after the car door was opened. R.l 12/25. Officer Gardiner
testified that the "level and tone of voice that was used to initiate contact with the
defendant" was: "Just like we're talking now. Urn, no yelling, or demanding
something, just talking with him." R. 112/18.
h.

"[K] nocked on glass

"

Officer Gardiner described his actions as having "knocked on the window".
R. 112/4-6. This would have been the driver's side window.
i. "[Mlay or may not have opened door".
Officer Gardiner testified that: "I don't know, I don't know what occurred,
whether he rolled down the window, or I opened the door, or he opened the door, I
do not recall that." R.l 12/13. Officer Hunt initially suggested that the defendant
woke up, and the defendant opened either the door or the window, although he was
not sure. Subsequently, Officer Hunt indicated that he was not sure who opened the
door first. R.l 12/23-24.
The findings by the trial court ( a - i above) had adequate support in the
record and do not rise to clear error.
2. The trial court's application of the law to the facts is correct
11

The trial court's conclusion that "No indicia that deft would feel reasonably
detained" (R.51) should be read as follows - There were therefore no indicia that
the defendant would feel _unreasonably detained.
The defendant relies heavily on State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997):
The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely
consensual encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring
reasonable suspicion) depends on whether, through a show of physical
force or authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is
restrained. Important to the determination is "whether defendant
'remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's
investigation, but because he believed he [was] not free to leave.'"
Furthermore, "the test for when the seizure occurs "only if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."
Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227 (citations omitted). The court describes this as a "totality
of the circumstances" test. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228.
The factors that where determinative to the Struhs court were (1) "the
officer's positioning of her vehicle" - "parking nose-to-nose with defendant's
vehicle", (2) "the officer's stealthy approach", (3) "the officer's sudden activation
of her high-beam headlights and white take-down lights", (4) "the time of night",
(5) "the isolation of the location", and (6) "the confrontational approach made by
the officer". Struhs 940 P.2d at 1228.
The case at hand is distinguishable from Struhs. Here, the police officers did
12

not park nose to nose with the defendant's car, did not blockade it in, and there was
an avenue of egress for the defendant's vehicle. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the officers' approach could be characterized as "stealthy" or
"confrontational". There is nothing to suggest in the record that the officers drove
into the parking lot with their lights turned off and suddenly turned them on.
Instead, after arriving in the parking lot the officers turned on a spotlight and
directed at the defendant's vehicle.

Indeed, the record suggests that until the

officers were at the defendant's door knocking on the window with a flashlight or
flashlights, the defendant was unaware of their presence, asleep or passed out.
The time of night and the location were the result of the defendant's apparent
choice to remain in his vehicle If a citizen decides to remain in a business parking
lot after hours, the citizen can reasonably expect to be contacted by officers or other
citizens to check on his welfare If a citizen places himself in a similar position he
is in essence inviting police officers 01 concerned citizens to initiate some contact
with him. Public policy now requires the citizen who intends to drive to a bar and
to drink to have laid plans for an alternative route home. Sleeping it off behind the
wheel of a car is unacceptable given that a citizen can awake at any time and drive
off while still intoxicated.
This is not a citizen driving home after working a late shift who swerves
13

because he is tired and is pulled over. This is not a citizen who is pulled over
without a driving pattern based on an expired registration. As a matter of public
policy, police are doing their job when they contact a citizen under these
circumstances. Thus, the time of night combined with the location here reinforce
the trial court's appropriate conclusion that the officers' initial contact was a
consensual Level I encounter.
Where the citizen's choice of a place to "sleep it off is behind a tavern and
behind the wheel, if an officer here opened the door, that act should be viewed as
one facilitating communication during a level I consensual stop, not effecting a stop
or seizure. By the officer's testimony, he did not ask the defendant to get out of the
vehicle here until he detected an odor of alcohol, and observed bloodshot e)es and a
flushed face. Thus, even if the officer opened the door to facilitate communication,
the citizen would have been free to terminate the encounter but for the observations
of the officer that gave rise to reasonable articulable suspicion as to the offense of
driving under the influence. If the officer had opened the door, and if the officer
observed nothing giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion, the citizen could
have terminated the encounter and could have gone on his way
There is nothing in the record to suggest, even if the officer did open the
door, that the citizen was not free to termnate the encounter.
14

B. "EVEN UNDER A "LEVEL TWO" REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION / SEIZURE ANALYSIS, THE OFFICERS HAD A BASIS
FOR THE CONTACT."
Even if this court determines that this was not a Level I consensual
encounter, this court should affirm the trial court's conclusion that a Level II
encounter was justified under the totalityof the circumstances:
Additionally, court finds that after discussion with deft he [Officer
Gardiner] had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
called to the scene by report of suspicious vehicle, it was 2:10 am,
outside a closed bar, vehicle was running, passenger prone, passed out
or asleep in vehicle. To suspect criminal activity. Evidence therefore
was lawfully obtained.
Trial court's "Decision on Motion to Suppress, R.51. Even under a Level II
Stop/Seizure Analysis, the totality of the circumstances here merit a finding that
those circumstances justified a stop or seizure of the United nature here.
1. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion of the Offense of Trespass
At the time of this encounter Officer Gardiner had some 21 years of
experience in law enforcement. Officer Gardiner indicated that he considered the
possibility that the person in the vehicle was trespassing. The officer observed a
running vehicle with a reclined person in the driver's seat behind a closed tavern at
2:00AM. Those facts raise a reasonable articulable suspicion of trespass:
Chapman asserts that all the factors justifying reasonable
15

suspicion listed by the trial court are consistent with innocent behavior
and thus, cannot amount to reasonable suspicion. The factors
enumerated by the trial court were "the lateness and darkness of the
hour, the emptiness of the school grounds, the presence of a young
teenage female in the vehicle and the fact that Chapman had no
apparent lawful business at the school." The trespass ordinance clearly
prohibits people from loitering about school grounds in vehicles
without any lawful business. The trial court's findings of fact show
that a reasonable person would conclude Chapman had violated the
ordinance.
State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The Salt Lake City trespass ordinance reads:
11.36.130 Trespass by persons and motor vehicles.
A.
It is unlawful for any person to . . . drive . . . or sleep
upon the premises of another without the permission of the owner or
occupant thereof, or to remain upon such premises after the permission
of the owner or occupant thereof has been revoked by such owner or
occupant.
*

*

;jc

*

* * * *
* * * *
*

*

5fc

5jC

»J»

-T£

' f c *J*

G. Violation of this section shall be punishable as follows:
1. Trespass in a dwelling shall constitute a Class B misdemeanor
violation.
2. Entering or remaining upon property, other than a dwelling,
where such trespass would cause injury or property damage, shall be a
Class C misdemeanor.
3. Trespass, other than a dwelling, where no damage or injury
occurs, is an infraction. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 323-3)
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the officer had before him facts that raised a reasonable
16

articulable suspicion of the offense of trespass, which would justify a Level II stop
or seizure. Under the totality of the circumstances, even if Officer Gardiner opened
the door prior to making any observations about the condition of the driver (other
than being reclined and unconscious), the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion regarding the offense of trespass.
2. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion of the Offense of DUI
Officer Gardiner indicated that the conversation did not take place through
glass, and that it took place with the defendant still in the vehicle. Thus, one of
three scenarios may have occurred: the defendant opened the window, the
defendant opened the door, or the officer opened the door.
a. If the defendant opened the window on his own, and Officer Gardiner
detected the odor of alcohol and slurred speech together in an individual
asleep/passed out in a reclined driver's seat of a running car behind a tavern at
2:00AM, a reasonable articulable suspicion regarding the charge of DUI would
merit a stop and/or seizure for further investigation.
b. If the defendant opened the door on his own, and Officer Gardiner
detected the odor of alcohol and slurred speech together in an individual
asleep/passed out in a reclined driver's seat of a running car behind a tavern at
2:00AM, a reasonable articulable suspicion regarding the charge of DUI would
17

merit a stop and/or seizure for further investigation.
c. If the officer opened the door. The final scenario is where Officer
Gardiner wakes the defendant and then opens the door on the officer's own
initiative. Apparently the door was unlocked. Even here there are three "subscenarios": (1) the officer opens the door without making any observations about
the defendant, and (2) the officer observes bloodshot eyes but no speech and opens
the door, and (3) the officer observes bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and then
opens the door.
(i) Sub-scenario (1).

In this scenario the officer observes a person

asleep/passed out/unconscious in the driver's seat of a running car behind a tavern
in the early morning hours. The record indicates that the officer considered the
possibility that the defendant was trespassing. The nature of the detention (opening
the door) and intrusion was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances,
as set forth above.
(ii) Sub-scenario (2). If the officer observed the defendant behind glass but
did not speak with him, he would have been able to see/observe the following
through glass: bloodshot eyes and flushed face. Bloodshot eyes and flushed face in
a person asleep/passed out behind a tavern at 2:00 in the morning is sufficient to
create a reasonable articulable suspicion and the officer would have been entitled to
18

open the defendant's door at that point.
(iii) Sub-scenario (3). If the officer waited to speak with the defendant
through the window glass, he would have been able to see/observe the following
through glass: slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and flushed face. Those observations
in a person asleep/passed out behind a tavern at 2:00 in the norning are sufficient to
create a reasonable articulable suspicion and the officer would have been entitled to
open the defendant's door at that point.
What the defendant appears to be suggesting is that at some point the
defendant would have been entitled to have just driven away from the scene. That
was not going to happen given the totality of the circumstances. If the defendant
refused to roll down his window, preventing the officer from detecting any odor of
alcohol, the officer would still have observed slurred speech, bloodshot watery
eyes, and a flushed face. Those factors combined with the context (time of day,
location, car running) would have justified the officer in seizing the defendant
under a Level II encounter analysis.

Thus, under any conceivable scenario, the

defendant would not have been free to leave the scene.
3. Community Caretaker Analysis as an alternative ground for affirmance.
Community caretaker analysis (CCA) is also applicable to this matter.
Although CCA was not set out by name the concerns at the core of CCA were
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brought to the attention of the trial court. People v. Ciesler, 304 Ill.App.3d 465,
710 N.E.2d 1270, 238 Ill.Dec. 168, was presented to the trial court in the City's
memorandum, and is found m the cuirent appellate record at R.35-39. Ciesler
refers to the "community caretakmg function or public safetyfunction":
Defendant's argument that Officer Berry was required to have
articulable suspicion that he had committed an offense before she
approached him does not change our conclusion. A police officer does
not violate a person's constitutional rights merely by approaching the
person on the street or m another public place and putting questions to
the person if he is willing to listen. Such a police-citizen encounter
does not involve coercion or detention and is referred to as a
community caretakmg function oi public safetyfunction.
Ciesler at 304 Ill.App.3d 465, 471, 710 N.E.2d 1270, 1275, 238 Ill.Dec. 168, 173,
R.39 (Citations omitted.)
This court can affirm the trial court decision based on a "community
caretaker" analysis:
However, appellate courts "can affirm the trial court on any proper
legal ground." State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). To do so, the legal ground mist be "apparent on the record" and
sufficiently briefed by the appellee. State v Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,
149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The State asserts that the decision allowing the search can be
most easily affirmed as a search incident to arrest. That ground was
"apparent on the record" because the record here contained "sufficient
and uncontroverted evidence supporting the [search incident to arrest]
to place [Chevre] on notice that the [State] may rely thereon appeal."
Id. The State also briefed the alternative ground of search incident to
arrest. Therefore, we need not determine whether the search can be
upheld as a valid inventory search if we can affirm on the alternative
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ground of search incident to arrest.
State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (Utah Ct App. 2000).
The initial inquiry is properly duected at the basis for police contacting the
defendant in his vehicle under the circumstances presented here.

The correct

analysis falls under the heading of "community caretaker stops", as delineated by
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Warden, the Court
set forth a three-part test:
The trial court must evaluate the legitimacy of an alleged community
caretaker stop as follows: First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based upon an objective
analysis, was the seizure in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function - under the given circumstances, would a reasonable officer
have stopped a vehicle for a purpose consistent with community
caretaker functions? Third, based upon an objective analysis, did the
circumstances demonstrate an imminent danger to life or hrrb?
Warden, 844 P.2d at 364
The motion hearing testimony supports the conclusion that at the point
officers arrived, the defendant would have been fiee to leave, and was in fact not
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. However, in the alternative, the
motion hearing testimony supports the conclusion that any "seizure" was m pursuit
of a "bona fide" community caretaker function.
Finally, the testimony indicates the circumstances demonstrated an imminent
danger to life or limb. An unconscious person in a running car might run the risk of
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carbon monoxide poisoning, or accidentally putting the car into gear and
endangering self or others. An intoxicated person asleep or passed out in a car runs
the risk of accidentally engaging the car, or awakening and intentionally driving the
car, putting self or others at risk. An ill person left unattended in a car runs the risk
presented by whatever malady has stricken - a heart attack would be one exanple.
Officer Gardiner testified that: "Well, that wasn't my overriding concern
[concern for the defendant's safety] but he was alone in the vehicle, and if indeed
he had been drinking some, or too much, that's just not a good area to be urn,
impaired in a vehicle." R. 112/15. This comment implies a concern for the safety of
an impaired person who has made himself vulnerable to predatory conduct by
others.
VII.

CONCLUSION
The defendant was not seized when the officers came upon him in his

vehicle. There was no seizure prior to Officer Gardiner's detection of an odor of
alcohol and observation of the defendant's flushed face and bloodshot eyes. The
defendant was in his vehicle, and free to terminate the encounter even if Officer
Gardiner had opened the door to his car.

There was no seizure prior to the

defendant committing an offense in the presence of the officers.
In the event this court rules otherwise, the evidence supports a finding that
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reasonable articulable suspicion existed meriting the limited intrusion represented
by the nature of any stop or seizure here.
The City respectfully requests that this court affirm the ruling of the trial
court, denying the defendant's motion to suppress, allowing the defendant's
conviction to stand upon remand to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^T

day of June, 2002.

Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM A
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12.24.100 Driving Under The Influence Of Drugs And Intoxicants
Prohibited-Penalties:
A.
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this Section for any person to
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this City if the person
has a blood or breath alcohol content of 0.08 grams or greater by weight as shown
by a chemical test given within two (2) hours after the alleged operation or physical
control, or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the City. The fact that a person charged
with violating this Section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
does not constitute a defense against anycharge of violating this Section.
B.
Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per one hundred milliliters (100 ml) of blood, and the percent by weight of
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per two
hundred ten liters (2101) of breath.
C.
Every person who is convicted of a violation of subsection A of this Section
shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
1. The court shall, upon a first conviction, inpose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than forty eight (48) consecutive hours nor
more than two hundred forty (240) hours; or
b. Require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less
than twenty four (24) hours nor more than fifty (50) hours.
2. The court shall also order the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, at the person's
expense.
3. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than seven hundred dollars
($700.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
D.
1. Upon a second conviction of subsection A of this Section within five (5)
years after a first conviction the court shall inpose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than two hundred forty (240) consecutive
hours nor more than seven hundred twenty(720) hours; or
b. As an alternative to all or a part of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less than eighty (80) hours nor more than
two hundred forty (240) hours.
2. In addition to the requirements of subsection Dla or Dlb of this Section, the
court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at
a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, and the court may, in its discretion, order
the person to obtain treatment at the person's expense at an alcohol rehabilitation
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facility.
3. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than eight hundred dollars
($800.00), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
E.
1. Upon a subsequent conviction of subsection A of this Section within five
(5) years after a second conviction, the court shall inpose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than seven hundred twenty (720) hours nor
more than two thousand one hundred sixty (2,160) hours, with emphasis on serving
in the drunk tank of the jail; or
b. As an alternative to all or a part of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work project for not less than two hundred forty(240) hours nor
more than seven hundred twenty(720) hours.
2. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than nine hundred dollars
($900.00), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
F.
In no event shall any combination of imprisonment and/or community service
imposed under subsections C, D and E of this Section exceed six (6) months'
duration.
G.
1. When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of
a violation of Section 12.52.350 of this Title, or its successor, in satisfaction of, or
as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this Section, the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not
defendant had consumed alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in connection
with the offense. The prosecutor's statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts
which show whether or not defendant had consumed alcohol or drugs, or a
combination of both, in connection with the offense.
2. The court shall advise the defendant, before accepting the plea offered under
subsection Gl of this Section, of the consequences of a violation of Section
12.52.350 of this Title, or its successor, in substance as follows: "If the court
accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating said
Section 12.52.350, and the prosecutor states for the record that there was
consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in
connection with the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for the
purpose of subsections D and E of this section."
H.
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this
Section when the officer has reasonable cause to believe a violation has in fact been
committed by the person, although not in the officer's presence.
I.
This Section was enacted to be in harmony with and, in substance, the same
as section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or its successor. (Ord.
23-96 §1,1996: Ord. 85-92 § 1, 1992: Ord. 60-92 § 1, 1992: Ord. 82-87 §1,1987:
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prior code Title 46, Art. 6 § 105)
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11.36.130 Trespass by persons and motor vehicles.
A.
It is unlawful for any person to take down any fence, or to let down any bars,
or to open any gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive, walk, lodge, or
camp or sleep upon the premises of another without the permission of the owner or
occupant thereof, or to remain upon such premises after the permission of the owner
or occupant thereof has been revoked bysuch owner or occupant.
B.
It is unlawful for any person to drive or park any motor vehicle, motorcycle
or motor-driven cycle upon any city-owned property not designated for vehicular
traffic or parking without permission of the mayor of the city or his or her
designated appointee.
C.
It is unlawful for any person to operate any type of motor vehicle (including
but not limited to motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, motorscooters or jeeps)
upon the private property of another, without first obtaining the written permission
of the person in lawful possession of the property or, if the property is unoccupied,
the owner of such property
D.
It is unlawful for any person to operate any type of motor vehicle (including
but not limited to motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, motorscooters or jeeps)
upon any public property, except designated streets, highways or alleys, without
first obtaining the written permission of the public entity which is in possession of
such property or, if the property is unoccupied, the public entity which owns such
property.
E.
Every person who operates any type of motor vehicle upon the private
property of another or upon any public property, except as hereinabove provided, at
all times while so operating such motor vehicle shall maintain in his or her
possession the written permission required by the two preceding subsections, except
that, if the same document grants permission to two or more persons, a person
named in such document need not have it in his or her possession while another
person named in the same document, riding in the same group and not more than
three hundred feet from such person, has such document in his or her possession.
F.
This section does not prohibit the use of such propertyby the following:
1. Emergency vehicles;
2. Vehicles of commerce in the course of normal business operations;
3. Vehicles being operated on property devoted to commercial or industrial
purposes where such operation is in conjunction with commercial or industrial use
and permission for such operation is implied or expressly given by the person in
possession of said property,
4. Vehicles operated on property actually used for residential purposes, where such
vehicles are there at the express or inplied invitation of the owner or occupant;
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5. Vehicles being operated on public or private parking lots, where pernission to do
so is implied or expressly given by the person in possession of such lot.
G.
Violation of this section shall be punishable as follows:
1. Trespass in a dwelling shall constitute a Class B nisdemeanor violation.
2. Entering or remaining upon property, other than a dwelling, where such trespass
would cause injury or property damage, shall be a Class C nisdemeanor.
3. Trespass, other than a dwelling, where no damage or injury occurs, is an
infraction. (Ord. 88-86 §60 (part), 1986: prior code §32-3-3)
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